This paper models stochastic order flow generations in a FX market. Like other financial asset markets, in order for a trader to have perspective on price, he must take other traders' perspectives into consideration. In our model, prices are formed through the interactions between heterogeneous price perspectives and the order flow from macro economy. The auctions are continuous. So we do not have truistic point of time to define liquidation value. Also applying demand and supply on their asynchronous transactions is difficult. We use alternative benchmark value and arrival intensities of order flow. We derive determinants of volume and volatility.
Introduction
Order flow is transaction volume that is signed. Lyons [1] Chapter 10 summaries significant influences of order flow on foreign exchange rates. He does not, however, present a model of order flow generation itself. Our theme is the structure of such order flow generations. This structure also determines volatility. Using our approach, we sort out determinants' effects on volume and volatility. It is possible to explain intra-day variability of volume / volatility correlation.
Inter-bank FX transactions have two channels. One is through brokers, and the other without broker. We model the first type of the auction channel. Price quotes go through brokers. Dealers are not obliged to keep quoting both prices. Only when they want, they submit limit orders to a broker. We assume the environment of the market as follows. There is a broker. The auction is continuous and double sided. Buyers and sellers compete in their own sides. Among submitted limit orders, the broker keeps announcing the best buying and selling prices. Spot foreign exchange is the commodity to trade. The market is geographically local. It has trading hours. There are many dealers. Let's take a representative dealer. He is risk neutral. His objective is daily profit maximization. He is allowed to have open position up to one transaction unit. Deliveries and settlements are scheduled for another day. So no interest cost incurs in order to have intra-day open position. He trades with retail customers any time they want during business hours. Their arrivals are asynchronous and random.
Analyses of continuous auction in financial market need extra approach. Transactions take place asynchronously. To handle this, we use arrival intensity of buyers and sellers, instead of demand and supply. The arrival intensity is expected number of arrivals per unit time. Use of the arrival intensity is in line with Garman [2] and Amihud, Yakov and Mendelson [3] . The next issue poses non trivial question. At a microstructure level, distinction between equilibrium and deviation is not truism. You should take advantage of errors, if many believe it. In such a environment, adverse selection problem is not major issue. Mere perspectives change outcome. So judging dispersion of heterogeneous price perspectives becomes important to make decisions. We face the following question: How do you form price expectation rational way while you know traders' perspectives collectively influence the actual outcome? Our answer is as follows: Dealers as a whole absorb unbalanced order flow from macro fundamentals. Meanwhile, dealers submit heterogeneous limit order prices. As these limit orders, one by one, absorb the unbalanced flow, transaction prices change. Our dealer perceives this mechanism. So he tries to fathom a distribution of reservation prices among dealers. Also he tries to foresee time path of the order flow arrivals. Then he expects configuration of price's time path. Dealers may agree on such a price determination mechanism. However, still heterogeneous perspectives persist. It is because information is limited. The distribution of reservation prices is not observable. Also dealers know only a fraction of order flow from macro economy as their own transactions.
In the next section, we present our model. In the last section, we summarize effects of model's parameters on volume and volatility. And we discuss empirical applicability and the theoretical issue with financial asset market.
Model

Switching Process of Perspectives
Currencies are traded 24 hours on the globe. They are done so consecutively by geographically local markets. We consider such a local market. It opens in the morning and ends in the evening. FX dealers trade in the local market. Closing hours overlaps with the opening hours of the next market. It is possible for dealers to have transaction with overseas counterparts then. This implies that the market need not be cleared at the closing time. There are Ò of dealers. 
By equation (2) Next we introduce demand and supply from the economy's fundamentals. They take a form of dealer's retail transactions. As dealers have retail transactions asynchronously, dealers have reverse transactions in the wholesale market. Let Ê ´Øµ and Ê ×´Ø µ be retail demand and supply from the fundamentals. They are aggregated across the dealers. They are accumulative from the morning until time Ø Let Ê´Øµ be excess demand defined as
The dealers as a whole absorb this excess demand. At any given time, dealers' net position becomes equal to excess demand; · Ê, where we suppressed time Ø Accounting equations are now as follows.
Then the index for the market bid is now;
Arrival Process of Order Flow
Revisions of Expectations
Order flow takes a form of hitting the market bid or ask.
In addition, we also include the following case as order flow arrival although it does not hit market rate: "Dealer enters state 1, picks reservation price. It turns out to be between the current bid and ask. He quotes bid and ask." We assume that bid/ask spread is negligible, if quoted by the same dealer. This kind of arrival of order flow is necessarily the case such that ¼ changes from 0 to 1. The order flow is generated by two sources. The first source is dealers' revisions of expectations. The second source is retail transactions. We describe the process of revision of expectations as a combination of a process of switching between two states and a process of choosing reservation price. The jth dealer has a random variable Á ´Øµ of equation (1) 
Retail Transactions
Retail demand and supply Ê ´Øµ and Ê ×´Ø µ are accumulative quantities retail customers bought from and sold to dealers until time Ø. They are sums over all Ò of dealers.
They have Poisson distributions with parameter and ×
Constructions of Ê ´Øµ and Ê ×´Ø µ are as follows.
Dealer's objective is daily profit maximization. He has retail customers. No marketing effort is made. He trades with them anytime they want during business hours. His profit is constant per transaction. Their arrivals constitute two Poisson processes; one for customer's buying and the other selling. Quantity of a retail arrivals is one transaction unit. These retail arrivals immediately change into Poisson arrivals at the market. Such conversion is due to the following assumption (p1) to (p3). (p1)" Dealer is risk neutral." (p2)" There is a restriction on the maximum size of position; one transaction unit." (p3)"Exceeding the restriction on the position due to retail transaction is allowed but only for a moment. 
Transitions between Market States
Transition Intensities
Matrix É's sum of the row is 0. The jth row of Ò has positive entries outside of Ò in matrix É.
Transition Probabilities
For a given infinitesimal operator É, we can obtain transition probability matrix È´Øµ by solving Kolmogrov's back-
È ¼´Ø µ ÉÈ´Øµ 
Distributions of Market Bid Rates
We have three finite intervals to define reservation prices. 
Then we can calculate Â´ µ . Since has Beta distribution (20), Â ½´ µ «´Ò ·½µ And Â ¾´ µ is obtained as a sum of incomplete beta integrals.
Expected Price Change by Transition
We consider price change during unit time interval. Let be this interval. We like to measure volatility by the following; Let ÈÖ´Ñ Ð Ò Ö µ be transition probability from ´Ò Ö µ into ´Ñ Ð µ during . Each ´Ò Ö µ has a density for the market bid and hence, Â´ µ ´Ò Ö µ Let ´Ò Ö µ be this expected value. We calculate ´Ñ Ð µ ´Ò Ö µ We approximate precise expected price change by this difference of expected values. Let ¡ ½´Ò Ö µ and ¡ ¾´Ò Ö µ be as follows;
Market state ´Ò Ö µ has the stationary probability, which is the limit of equation (17). It is probability to be there on average for Ø large. Let ´Ò Ö µ be that stationary probability. We approximate variance of interval's price change by the following quantity.
Variability of Volatility
In order to obtain qualitative conclusions about ¡ Ú , we assume the following three conditions.
´Ýµ of equation (21) Random Variable is the bid rate on S-interval. This is mapped onto C-interval as defined by equation (19). The bid rate comes to have larger volatility as ½ increases. Larger ½ also implies that reservation prices are more heterogeneous.
Random variable Ê is difference of two Poisson variables. By the central limit theorem, the difference of two Poisson variables converges to a normal distribution ( Johnson, Kotz & Kemp [5] ). Our Ê has both tails truncated; condition of equation (11) 
Consistency of Model with Regard to Expectation Formation
Our model presupposes the heterogeneous reservation prices. Its price determination process allows the heterogeneity persist. Wada [6] reports statistically significant effects of volume on volatility, using spot USD/JPY tick data. The data cover from June '95 to April '96 in Tokyo. For every five minute interval, he regresses volatility on volume. Except for lunch time, the regression coefficients are all positive. They are also statistically significant except for a few in the afternoon. Lunch time period is different; very low volume and higher volatility. Thus volume and volatility tend to have positive correlation. However, it varies with an intraday pattern.
Our explanation: Demand and supply from macro economy Ê and Ê × come faster in the morning. Also due to more uncertainty with regard to daily totals of Ê and Ê × , reservation prices spread wider in the morning.
Volume and heterogeneity effects work together. As for lunch time, Ê and Ê × are smaller and revision cycle is longer. Volume is reduced. Meanwhile thickness effect of smaller AE ½ makes volatility higher. The latter effect more than cancels the former. As a result, higher volatility can accompany small volume for lunch time.
The existing microstructure literature has not been satisfactory with regard to handling of the lack of apparent benchmark values in case of continuous auctions of financial assets. Planning horizon can be any length to seek capital gains. Defining liquidation value is not truism. This theoretical issue is coupled with self prophecy aspect of price perspectives. Since feedback from macro economy is weak and hence price perspectives are very influential, a trader has to consider perspective's dispersion among others to have his own. The lack of apparent benchmark value becomes nontrivial to handle. Our model provides alternative approach. We do no rely on the exogenously given liquidity value. Our benchmark value is the first local extremum on the expected time path. It becomes reservation price. Its distribution among dealers determines price and its volatility. Meanwhile exogenous forces of retail transactions also enter the price determination process. Our approach looks promising.
